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 Hannah Arendt  presented her understanding of totalitarianism in the 
book The Origins of Totalitarianism, but she realized that the word origin 
does not really fit into her narrative and started talking about the elements of 
totalitarianism; the elements which crystallized into totalitarian regimes. 
 Unfortunately that does not solve the problem because Nazism and 
Stalinism do not share a set of elements. The author presents and discusses 
the logic of Arendt’s narrative which wants to connect two disparate processes 
- the birth of Nazism and the birth of Stalinism. He shows how Arendt tried 
to solve the problem by using two methodologically different and irreconcilable 
understandings of totalitarianism.  
 
 In this essay I will discuss Hannah Arendt’s understanding of totalitari-
anism. The book in which Arendt presented her concept is called The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism, but as she admits in her Reply to Eric Voghelin’s 
Review, “The book … does not really deal with the ’origins’ of totalitarian-
ism - as its title unfortunately claims - but gives a historical account of 
the elements which crystallized into totalitarianism.” In the same text Ar-
endt gives us rather important advice on how to read her book: “The 
elementary structure of totalitarianism is the hidden structure of the book, 
while its more apparent unity is provided by certain fundamental concepts 
which run like red threads through the whole.” This means that the ap-
parent structure of the book (Antisemitism - Imperialism - Totalitarianism) 
does not automatically reveal the elementary structure of totalitarianism. 
However, the only way to find out what the hidden structure is, is to 
fallow the logic of the apparent structure, to read Arendt’s book from the 
beginning, and to try to understand the logic of her narrative. The book I 
will write about is not the first editions of The Origins, but the edition 
from 1966, the one ending with Arendt’s discussion of the relationship be-
tween ideology and terror. I believe that the last chapter of the book de-
stroys the logic of Arendt’s narrative and introduces a new and different 
understanding of totalitarianism. That is why my essay consists of two 
parts: 
A - follows and presents the apparent structure of the book; 
B - compares Arendt’s and Marcuse’s understanding of the relationship be-
tween Stalinism and Marx’s thought. 
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 I would like to show that (Arendt after 1966) has two methodologically 
different concepts of totalitarianism. 
 
A 
 The first part of The Origins is called Antisemitism. It consists of four 
chapters. The first one prepares the discussion and shows the way in 
which Arendt would like to think about the relationship between an-
tisemitism and totalitarianism. She wants to explain how the “unimportant 
Jewish problem” had “the dubious honor of setting the whole infernal ma-
chine in motion.”1 Neither antisemitism nor Jewish problem can be under-
stood as origins if by origin we mean a source or a cause from which a 
thing (a phenomenon) begins its existence. When Arendt writes about an-
tisemitism she does not search for the causes of totalitarianism but instead 
tries to understand how a relatively “unimportant problem” becomes essen-
tial in a certain political and historical situation. The history of totalitari-
anism is the history of overlapping stories. One of them is about Euro-
pean Jews. 
 The second chapter presents the position of the Jews in the pre-nation 
and nation-state, and discusses a few different forms of antisemitism. In 
the third chapter the Jewish problem is analyzed in the context of society. 
It is not always clear what Arendt means by society (because she uses the 
same word for a number of disparate things) but her distinctions between 
vice and crime and between pariah and parvenu bring to light a set of 
problems which were not solved in post-Enlightenment European countries. 
One of them is the identification of emancipation and assimilation in 
which the Jews are reduced to abstract human beings and encouraged to 
be “men in the street and the Jews at home.” 
 Arendt understands the Jewish question as a part of a larger problem 
of “degeneration” of the citoyen into the bourgeois which culminated in 
the Dreyfus Affair. 
 The fourth chapter tries to explain the consequences of the Dreyfus 
Affair. One of the most interesting things is the appearance of the mob. 
Arendt points out that the mob should clearly be distinguished from the 
people: like the people it consists of all strata of society, but unlike the 
people it is not interested in a true representation - it wants a ”strong 
man”, or a “great leader.” The mob exists beyond the institutions of the 
nation-state and it is not represented in a parliament. The Dreyfus Affair 
showed the inability of the bourgeois parties to represent the true feelings 
of the electorate. After the affair it became obvious that the bourgeois 
understanding of politics in which economic interests were actual origins of 
 
  1Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, A Harvest Book, New York, 
1979, p. 3. 
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political activity, can have fatal consequences, because the mob was not a 
part of the bourgeois game. The nation-state was not designed to deal 
with the mob. 
 The first part of the book (Antisemitism) pointed out a few difficult 
problems; the structure of the nation-state and the position of the Jews 
within the nation-state were constantly analyzed by Arendt. In the second 
part of the book (Imperialism) the decline of the nation-state is presented 
through a discussion of the relationship between the state and the bour-
geoisie. Imperialism should be understood in the light of that discussion. 
 Hannah Arendt believes that the political emancipation of the bourgeoi-
sie happened with the appearance of imperialism. The nation-state, which 
was originally not the bourgeois state, became the bourgeois state in order 
to allow for the process of imperialist expansion. “Imperialism was born 
when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national 
limitations to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics 
out of economic necessity; for it did not want to give up the capitalist 
system whose inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose 
this law upon its home governments and to proclaim expansion to be an 
ultimate goal of foreign policy.”2 
 Imperialists are capitalists who desire power as a means for appropri-
ating wealth. Imperialist politics becomes international power politics and 
consequently the most important function of the nation-state becomes the 
accumulation and expansion of power. The state functions in the interest 
of the society - the citoyen is swallowed by the bourgeois, and politics is 
sucked into economics. “If man is actually driven by nothing but his indi-
vidual interest, desire for power must be the fundamental passion of 
man.”3  
 The next fundamental element of totalitarianism is racism. Arendt un-
derstands racism in the historical context of imperialism. For her racism is 
a bridge between nationalism and imperialism. She believes that imperial-
ists were trying to show that they were above and beyond political parties 
and that is why the became “parasites upon patriotism.” Race-thinking 
which was just a doctrine in the eighteen century was used as a founda-
tion for imperialistic ideology in the nineteenth century. The doctrine was 
turned into a political weapon of economic expansion. Race thinking was 
useful because it destroys the idea of mankind, and functions perfectly as 
an excuse for international crimes committed by imperialists. 
 After racism Arendt discusses the pan-movements. They also play a 
large role in her narrative. The chapter is called Continental Imperialism: 
the Pan-Movements. A few important political phenomena are analyzed in 
 
  2Arendt, op.cit., p.126. 
  3Arendt, op.cit., p.139. 
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the chapter. Tribal nationalism is one of them. By tribal nationalism Ar-
endt understands a specific form of nationalism which is based on the 
“atmosphere of rootlesness”. It should be distinguished from ordinary na-
tionalism which is “the expression of this perversion of the state into an 
instrument of the nation and the identification of the citizen with the 
member of the nation.”4 The absence of the nation state causes the at-
mosphere of rootlesness. This kind of atmosphere was strongly present in 
Austria-Hungary and Czarist Russia, and it was the source of “tribal con-
sciousness”. Tribal consciousness appears when members of stateless peo-
ples, who are as peoples ’homeless’, feel at home wherever other members 
of their ’tribe’ live. 
 Pan-movements are also based on tribal consciousness but their goal is 
not a national emancipation; they want to create a new type of national 
empire, and that is why Arendt believes that the pan-movements were a 
form of imperialism. One of the most important things (in the context of 
The Origins) is the fact that antisemitism played a large role in the forma-
tion of tribal consciousness. Georg von Schoenerer, the godfather of Pan- 
Germanism, understood antisemitism as an instrument for forcing the 
direction of foreign policy. The pan-movements were functioning beyond 
the formal borders of European nation-states and their idea was to change 
borders and establish natural political units. One of the ways to create a 
necessary sentiment of belonging was to foster the collective hatred of the 
Jews. Like English and French imperialists, who were above political par-
ties and who identified their business interests with a national interest, the 
pan-movements attacked the party system and tried to identify themselves 
with the people. Imperialists were “above the parties”, the pan-movements 
”above the state”. In both cases European party system was put in 
question.  
 In Arendt’s understanding of totalitarianism the fact that the move-
ments were above the state is very important. I will discuss her under-
standing of the totalitarian movement below. 
 The last chapter of the second part of the book (The Decline of the 
Nation - State and The End of the Rights of Man) describes the beginning 
of the end of “the very structure of European civilization”. Arendt writes 
about the role of hatred in politics, the liquidation of Dual Monarchy and 
the Czarist empire, and about unsolved national disorder, all of which 
clearly illustrate the emptiness of the post-Enlightenment ideological 
promises.  
 The World Wars created the problem of the stateless people, the 
problem which helps one to see that the basis of European political civili-
zation is the trinity of state-nation-territory. The rights of men are re-
spected only within the framework of a nation-state which consequently 
 
  4Arendt, op.cit., p.231. 
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means that the rights of men do not belong to men as men, but to citi-
zens of nation-states. The right to have rights presupposes a place in the 
world, a framework which makes one’s opinions significant and respected. 
The inalienable rights of man are actually unenforceable and the loss of 
polity automatically means the loss of humanity. 
 Totalitarianism was almost invented to put some order into European 
political confusion. 
 So far I have been following Arendt’s way of presenting the elements 
which crystallized into totalitarianism. The elements were antisemitism, the 
appearance of the mob, imperialism, racism, and the pan-movements. The 
fundamental concept which provided the unity of Arendt’s theoretical op-
eration was the nation-state. In the next part of my essay I will follow 
the same approach; I will present Arendt’s understanding of totalitarianism 
in three steps. The part of the book called Totalitarianism has four chap-
ters, but the last chapter was written a few years later and I believe it 
should be discussed separately. 
 Arendt starts her discussion of totalitarianism with an analysis of a 
classless society. 
 How did something like a classless society come into being? The class-
less society is a result of the breakdown of the class system, the system 
on which the European nation-sates were based. The breakdown of the 
class system automatically means the breakdown of the party system. The 
party system expresses the plurality of economic interests presenting them 
in the political sphere. It shows that politics in the nation-state is derived 
from the economy. Different groups can recognize and formulate their pri-
vate interests and then try to put them forward politically, but what hap-
pens when individuals are not able to formulate their interests, or when 
political parties are not recognized as representatives of private interests? 
Than we can not talk about a class society any more, we have to deal 
with a mass society. The nation-state as a form of government can not 
’accommodate’ masses. 
 When she was writing about the Dreyfus Affair Arendt presented the 
mob as an interesting problem, interesting because the mob was existing 
and operating beyond the institutions of the nation-state. With the appear-
ance of the masses the nation-state has, formally speaking, the same 
problem, but this time the masses comprise the majority of the population, 
which means that the nation-state can no longer function. The major crisis 
of capitalism which shook European political civilization after WW1 made 
any kind of bourgeois politics impossible, because politics was an expres-
sion of economy and economy was in a mess. The bourgeoisie, whose 
apathy and hostility toward public life destroyed genuine politics, simply 
asked for trouble. Adolf Hitler freed the masses from the modern “chaos 
of opinions”; he showed the way out of neurotic social situation in which 
atomized individuals did not know who they were, what they wanted and 
 
Kureli}. Z., The Dark Crystal, Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 86—98 91 
                                                                                                                                              
why their lives were so miserable. The masses were not suitable for the 
party system, but the were perfect for the movement. Totalitarianism of-
fered a solution to the deep crisis. 
 “Simply to brand as outbursts of nihilism this violent dissatisfaction with 
the prewar age and subsequent attempts at restoring it (from Nietzche and 
Sorel to Pareto, from Rimbaud and T.H. Lawrence to Junger, Brecht and 
Malreaux, from Bakunin and Nechayev to Alexander Blok) is to overlook 
how justified disgust can be in a society wholly permeated with the ideo-
logical outlook and moral standards of the bourgeoisie.”5 Arendt was ap-
palled by the pre-totalitarian European society. 
 The next step in her analysis of totalitarianism is the totalitarian 
movement. Arendt begins her discussion with totalitarian propaganda. 
Propaganda is important because it sucks the masses into the movement. 
It is a way in which totalitarian ideology becomes known to the masses. 
For Arendt ideology is a doctrine used as a political weapon, a doctrine 
which claims to posses “the key to history” and the solution to all 
“riddles of the universe.” Ideology which sounds like a scientific prophecy 
and which is able to give answers to all questions is a perfect solution for 
the confusion of atomized individuals who do not know anything about 
anything. Totalitarian propaganda can insult common sense, writes Arendt, 
only when common sense has lost its validity. Totalitarian propaganda did 
not have to prepare its audience, the job was done during the period of 
imperialism and through the decline of the nation-state. 
 Now I would like to stress a point made by Arendt. She recognizes a 
relatively big difference in the prehistory of Nazism and Bolshevism. “That 
totalitarian movements depend less on the structurelessness of a mass soci-
ety than on the specific conditions of an atomized and individualized 
mass, can best be seen in a comparison of Nazism and Bolshevism which 
began in their respective countries under very different circumstances. To 
change Lenin’s revolutionary dictatorship into full totalitarian rule, Stalin 
had firs to create artificially that atomized society which had been pre-
pared for the Nazis in Germany by historical circumstances.”6 The ideal 
soil and the perfect environment for the totalitarian movement is the 
bourgeois-type atomized mass. Without it, it is difficult to talk abut the 
movement, and that is why Lenin’s part was not a totalitarian movement. 
I will return to this point later, because it tells us a lot about the hidden 
structure of the book. 
 Totalitarian organization is another extremely important element of Ar-
endt’s story about the totalitarian movement. It is also her first attempt to 
seriously compare Nazism and Stalinism. The easiest way to compare Na-
zism and Stalinism is to compare the roles of Hitler and Stalin within 
 
  5Arendt, op.cit., p.328. 
  6Arendt, op.cit., p.318. 
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their movements. That is how Arendt starts. The totalitarian movement 
has a specific onion-like structure in which each layer comprises the front 
of the next more militant formation. In the center of the movement is 
the leader. He has to act as a “magic defense” of the movement and to 
function as a bridge which connects the movement with the rest of the 
world. He must be a part of the masses and the great leader at the 
same time. Both Hitler and Stalin had to fulfill the same function and 
they did so with help from the conspiratory sector. The conspiratory sector 
represents leader’s inner circle. That is where the power is. “Nazism and 
Bolshevism arrived at the same organizational result from very different 
historical beginnings. The Nazis started with the fiction of a conspiracy 
and modeled themselves, more or less consciously, after the example of 
the secret society of the Elders of Zion, whereas the Bolsheviks came 
from a revolutionary party, whose aim was one-party dictatorship, passed 
through a stage in which the party was ’entirely apart and above every-
thing’ to the moment when the Politburo of the party was ’entirely and 
above everything’; finally Stalin imposed upon this party structure the rigid 
totalitarian rules of the conspiratory sector and only then discovered the 
need for a central fiction to maintain the iron discipline of a secret soci-
ety under the conditions of a mass organization.”7 This is a very impor-
tant point. The essential difference between Lenin’s party and Stalin’s 
movement was the role of the conspiratory sector. When the balance of 
the forces changed and when the conspirators became the most powerful 
element of the one-party dictatorship, the totalitarianism in the Soviet 
Union was born. The one-party dictatorship became a totalitarian regime. 
The connection between the leader and the conspiratory sector is the most 
important factor of totalitarian organization. 
 Hannah Arendt continues her discussion in the next chapter 
(Totalitarianism in Power) in which she finally tries to show that Nazism 
and Stalinism are essentially the same. 
 What happens when the totalitarian movement seizes power in one 
country? How does the movement understand the system of existing politi-
cal institutions? Arendt makes a strong point - the movement does not 
have to change institutions, it can use them as a transmission of power 
and create a parallel system of power. The movement duplicates offices 
and does not want to achieve a fusion of the state and the party but to 
keep the power unchecked. Real power begins where secrecy begins. The 
Nazis did not have to abolish the Weimar constitution, and they left the 
civil services intact. They formed a regime which is strictly speaking not a 
government but a movement in power. Arendt understands that totalitari-
anism can not be analyzed like any other form of government it is 
“shapeless” and structureless. In fact it has two structures, the elements of 
pre-totalitarian political system, and the onion-like structure of the move-
 
  7Arendt, op.cit., p.378. 
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ment. This is why Arendt does not know how to define totalitarianism. 
She talks about “totalitarian regime” (p.379), “totalitarian system” (p.384), 
“totalitarian government” (p.395), “totalitarianism as a form of government 
and movement” (Reply to Voegelin p.373) and a “form of political op-
pression” (p.460). Arendt clearly sees two things: first, that totalitarianism 
as a new political phenomenon can not be described with pre-totalitarian 
categories of political theory; second, that the right way to show that Na-
zism and Stalinism are essentially the same is not to compare their politi-
cal (and economic) structures. One can not compare the shape of shape-
less things, but one can compare totalitarian actions, and consequences of 
these actions. This is exactly what Arendt does. She does not try to prove 
that Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union have the same type of 
political system, but she wants to show that Gulag and Aushwitz are 
essentially the same. That consequently means that the concentration and 
extermination camps should be understood as the central institution of the 
totalitarian regime. In the camps totalitarianism shows what it is actually 
about. It is an attempt to destroy individuality, plurality and spontaneity of 
human beings, it is an attempt to destroy the human nature.  
 The camps are the space in which everything is possible. Arendt even 
identifies totalitarianism with total domination in her Preface to Part Three 
where she says: “There existed an obvious alternative to Stalin’s seizure of 
power and transformation of the one-party dictatorship into total domina-
tion…”8 The fundamental difference between Lenin’s and Stalin’s Soviet 
Union is the presence of terror. Pure totalitarian terror is exercised in the 
concentration camps. “But if in Germany the really totalitarian type of 
concentration camps with its enormous majority of completely “innocent” 
inmates was not established until 1938, in Russia it goes back to the early 
thirties, since up to 1930 the majority of the concentration camp popula-
tion still consisted of criminals, counterrevolutionaries and ’politicals’ …”9 
Before 1930, and 1938 Soviet Union and Germany were, strictly speaking 
not totalitarian. Finally, how shall we describe and understand the horror 
of Aushwitz and Gulag? The only way to understand and articulate the 
unspeakable horror of the camps is to show that they allowed for the 
presence of “radical evil”. “The radical evil” came into being, “some radi-
cal evil previously unknown to us” (p.443). “The totalitarian hell” is the 
real Hell on Earth. In the Gaus interview Arent says “It was as if an 
abyss had opened” and in Reply to Voegelin she writes: “When I used the 
image of Hell, i did not mean this allegorically but literally.” Evil is what 
totalitarianism is about, evil “previously unknown to us”. 
 This is the end of the story. The book should have ended with the 
chapter on total domination. The chapter Ideology and Terror a Novel 
 
  8Arendt, op.cit., p. xxxi. 
  9Arendt, op.cit., p. 450. 
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Form of Government (written a few years later) does not belong here, it is 
a part of another story. 
 In Reply to Voegelin Arendt said that the elementary structure of totali-
tarianism was the hidden structure of the book. The apparent structure of 
the book functions, formally speaking, like the structure of Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness. A reader of Arendt’s book goes through the jungle of Euro-
pean history, and Arendt tries to explain different elements which in a 
specific historical situation crystallized into a dark crystal - totalitarianism. 
What happened to Mr Kurtz individually, happened to the entire Euro-
pean political civilization in the moment when totalitarianism was born. 
Just as Kurtz found the darkness of his own soul, totalitarianism revealed 
the darkness of Europe. It tried to solve problems which were created be-
fore its appearance. The apparent structure has an obvious problem. 
Czarist Russia was, strictly speaking, not a part of European political civi-
lization. Stalin had to produce the masses of atomized individuals in order 
to create a totalitarian movement. The book is called The Origins of To-
talitarianism, but Nazi type of totalitarianism and Stalinism do not share a 
set of origins. If we change the word origin into element the problem is 
not solved, because Nazism and Stalinism do not share any elements ei-
ther.10 That shows us the hidden structure of the book. The book is 
about the elements of Nazism and the presence of radical evil. Arendt 
found out that Nazism and Stalinism are essentially the same by compar-
ing crimes of two regimes. She did not compare their formal political 
structures because according to her analysis of the totalitarian movement 
the formal political structure was not relevant. It is not important how 
regimes formally look like but; it is important what they do. The hidden 
structure of the book reveals the structurelessness of totalitarianism. 
 
B 
 Now I would like to compare Arendt’s ideas from the last chapter with 
the rest of the book and with Marcuse’s understanding of Soviet Marxism. 
I decided to compare Arendt’s and Marcuse’s solutions because I believe 
that that comparison can help us to understand Arendt’s theoretical prob-
lems. In the last chapter of The Origins she wants to answer the question: 
Is there a common origin of totalitarianism? The rest of the book says 
that the common origin does not exist, but the last chapter is different. 
The answer to the question is - Yes, ideology is the common origin. How 
did Arendt find this answer? She changed the methodological approach. If 
we want to find the origins of totalitarianism through the historical ap-
proach we will find out that Russian history did not secure elements 
 
  10Seyla Benhabib pointed out the same problem in her essay “Hannah Arendt 
and Redemptive Power of Narrative” published in Hannah Arendt - Critical Essays, 
edited by Hinchman & Hinchman, State University of New York Press, 1994. 
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which could have crystallized into Stalinism, because Stalinism is crystalliza-
tion of Leninism. That is why Arendt looked for the origins of Stalinism 
in Marx’s philosophy, not in Russian history. Methodologically this is a ge-
neology of ideology. 
 The notion of ideology plays an important role before the last chapter, 
and it is usually connected with the notion of terror, but it is never the 
central notion. The logic of Arendt’s argument in which total domination 
is almost identified with totalitarianism, makes terror the focus of her dis-
cussion. The non-utilitarian character of total domination, and the non-
utilitarian exercising of terror are radically evil. That is the way to destroy 
human nature and the destruction itself. Terror is not just an instrument 
of the system, terror is telos of the system, whether Nazis and Stalinists 
know that or not. They can think that the camps are just an instrument 
of totalitarian rule and that everything is justified in order to fulfill their 
historical role, but what they actually do is destroy human nature. Ideology 
is consequently an instrument of terror. It creates a phantom world of fic-
tion, a world in which terror can rule. Arendt does not try to present the 
self-understanding of Nazis and Stalinists, but to show what actually 
happened.  
 In the last chapter the emphasis is changed. Terror is still the essence 
of totalitarian domination, but it is also “the realization of the law of 
movement” and “the execution of the law of movement”. What is new? 
Arendt now takes seriously the content of totalitarian ideology, and re-
spects the self-understanding of totalitarians. They thought that terror was 
an instrument, a weapon necessary to actualize the law of movement 
which is the law of history. Why did this change take place? In the rest 
of the book Arendt has concentration camps on her mind, while in the 
last chapter she focuses on the ideology of Bolsheviks. She does not try 
to show that Gulag and Aushwitz are equally evil, but that Nazi and Bol-
shevik ideologies are, formally speaking, the same. Aren’t all ideologies, 
formally speaking, the same? What is special about totalitarian ideologies? 
Ideology is fundamental to totalitarianism, because it is the standpoint 
from which the world is criticized. Terror which functions in the name of 
ideology, “seeks to ’stabilize’ men in order to liberate the forces of nature 
or history.” Ideology understood in this way is not an element of to-
talitarianism, but a common origin par excellence. Terror becomes lawful-
ness, a way to establish the rule of justice on Earth. In Arendt’s under-
standing of totalitarian ideology Darwin is a link between Nazis and Bol-
sheviks. “Underlying the Nazis’ belief in race laws as the expression of the 
law of nature in man, is Darwin’s idea of man as the product of a 
natural development which does not necessarily stop with the present spe-
cies of human beings, just as under the Bolsheviks’ belief in class-struggle 
as the expression of the law in history lies Marx’s notion of society as the 
product of a gigantic historical movement which races according to its own 
law of motion to the end of historical times when it will abolish itself … 
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Engels could not think of a greater compliment to Marx’s scholarly 
achievements than to call him the “Darwin of history.” 
 If one considers, not the actual achievement, but the basic philosophies 
of both man, it turns out that ultimately the movement of history and the 
movement of nature are one and the same… The ’natural’ law of the sur-
vival of the fittest is just as much a historical law and could be used as 
much by racism as Marx’s law of the survival of the most progressive 
class.”11 Is Arendt’s naturalization of Marx correct? If it is she can say 
that there is a theoretical continuity between Marx’s thought and Stalinism 
and that Marxism is an intellectual origin of totalitarianism. I will not 
comment on Arendt’s understanding now. First I will briefly present a few 
ideas from the first part of Marcuse’s book Soviet Marxism, and then 
compare Marcuse’s and Arendt’s theoretical solutions. 
 Marcuse wants to show the relationship between Marx’s philosophy and 
Lenin’s interpretation of Marx, and the relationship between Leninism and 
Stalinism. The question is - Is Marx’s thought an essential, central part of 
Soviet Marxism? Soviet Marxism is Soviet ideology and if Marx has a fun-
damental role in Soviet Marxism then Arendt’s understanding is correct. 
 In the introduction Marcuse compares Hegel and Marx. Hegel believed 
in objective historical laws which were for him the manifestation of Rea-
son. History was for Hegel at the same time logical and teleological proc-
ess, and it was progress in the consciousness and the realization of 
freedom. 
 For Marx history progresses through the development of the productive 
forces, but that progress is not the realization of Freedom, but the crea-
tion of the ’prerequisites’ of Freedom. For Marx, points out Marcuse, his-
tory is not the manifestation of reason but the opposite. “What is history 
to Hegel is still prehistory to Marx.”12 It is possible to talk about histori-
cal laws in Marx’s philosophy, but the laws are separated from teleology. 
Historical changes from one social system to another happen when the de-
velopment of productivity and changes in the basic division of labor cause 
the transformation of the old political and cultural institutions. The new 
society is born within the framework of the old. In Marx’s theory there is 
no metaphysical Reason underlying the process and no telos toward which 
history is moving. The historical development proceeds through the action 
of men, who are the historical agent. How does Marx see the transition 
from capitalism to socialism? Is there going to be a revolution, and who 
is going to be the subject of the revolution? Marcuse makes a very 
important point here, he stresses that the subject of socialist revolution is 
the industrial proletariat. “The revolution was to be the direct organized 
 
  11Arendt, op.cit., p. 463. 
  12Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, 
p. 2. 
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action of the proletariat as a class - or it was not at all. Marx and 
Engels did not recognize any other agent of the revolution nor any 
’substitute’ for it, for substitution would signify the immaturity of the class 
as such.”13 
 Why is this so important for Marcuse? Because he believes that the 
essential difference between Marx and Soviet Marxism arises from the 
change of the revolutionary subject (agent). Lenin’s revolution did not 
happen within the framework of highly developed capitalism, and the role 
of the industrial proletariat was changed. The subject of the revolution 
was revolutionary avant-garde; the class consciousness was brought upon 
the proletariat from without and the proletariat was transformed from the 
subject to an object of the revolutionary process. The Bolshevik party was 
the subject of the revolution because it knew the interest of working class 
better than the class itself. The party knew the Truth, it was the incarna-
tion of the Truth. Lenin turned Marx up side down, and he was forced 
to do so because the revolution should not have happened in a pre-capi-
talist country. There is an obvious theoretical break between Marx and 
Lenin, what about the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. “In view of 
the constancy of the main elements of Soviet Marxism, the question must 
be asked whether there is a ’break’ between Leninism and Stalinism. The 
difference between the first years off the Bolshevik  
 Revolution and the fully developed Stalinist state is obvious; they read-
ily appear as the steady growth of totalitarianism and authoritarian cen-
tralization … But if the dialectical law of the turn from quantity into qual-
ity was ever applicable, it was in the transition from Leninism … to Stalin-
ism.”14 Marcuse recognizes a connection and a continuity between Lenin 
and Stalin, but at the same time clearly sees the new quality of Stalinism. 
Obviously Marcuse’s and Arendt’s understanding of the problem is quite 
different. Marcuse does not believe that Marx thought that the movement 
of nature and the movement of history were teleological and one and the 
same. Unlike Arendt he sees the break between Marx and Lenin and the 
continuity between Lenin and Stalin. His analysis shows us the problem of 
Arendt’s methodological approach in the last chapter. If the law of nature 
and the law of history are one and the same and it the law of na-
ture(history) is identified with the law of movement (if the Bolshevik/Nazi 
party knows the Truth) and if terror is the execution of law of move-
ment, then the massacre of anarchists in Kronstat and the extermination 
of the Jews in the concentration camps are, formally speaking, the same. 
In both cases the victims were killed in the name of historical(natural) 
truth, and in the name of the movement. From the position of totalitarian 
ideology both crimes were rational and utilitarian. That is a problem for 
Arendt because one of the most interesting distinctions in the rest of the 
 
  13Marcuse, op.cit., p. 26. 
  14Marcuse, op.cit., p. 74. 
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book is the distinction between the one-party dictatorship of Lenin and 
the totalitarian regime of Stalin (the distinction between Nazi regime 
before 1938 and after 1938). This distinction no longer works. Arendt 
tried to reconcile two different methodological approaches, but unfortu-
nately that was impossible. 
 However, the logic of Arendt’s original narrative in which totalitarian-
ism(Nazism) is understood as a specific historical ’constellation’ of ele-
ments, as the crystallization in which Hell appeared on Earth is still im-
pressive. ’Systems’, regimes are totalitarian when they generate evil, their 
structure is less important. Arendt did not compare political institutions 
and the economy of Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union, she was not 
trying to prove that their political systems function in the same way 
(which is the liberal approach). Her book is therefore ideologically useless. 
Lenin, Stalin and Kruschev lived in a same kind of system, but only Sta-
lin’s Soviet Union was totalitarian. If we stay on the level of the analysis 
of the institutions it is impossible to see what happened, because Stalin 
did not change Lenin’s institutions and Kruschev did not change Stalin’s 
institutions either (in the same way the political and economical system 
was not changed in Germany after 1938). Hannah Arendt knows the an-
swer, but we can know whether a regime is totalitarian or not only a 
posteriori. Arendt’s solution can not be understood as the cold war 
thinking because her fundamental position is that totalitarianism is an 
radically evil answer to problems which were created by the nation-state, 
and especially by the lack of genuine politics in that kind of state. She 
was not disgusted only with totalitarianism, and nowadays when Europe for 
the second time allowed the appearance of radical evil, it is not difficult 
to see why. “Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian 
regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it 
seems impossible to alleviate political, social or economic misery in a 
manner worthy of man.”15 
 
  15Arendt, op.cit., p. 459. 
